Submitted by Anonymous (not verified) on Fri, 02/21/2014 - 16:24
On February 22, 2012, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in Jennings v. Jennings, 670 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2012). The case involved the issue of whether debt arising from the debtor's active participation with a co-conspirator in performing a fraudulent transfer of real property was excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§523(a)(6) which provides that a debt for "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity" is non-dischargeble. The Court upheld the District Court's decision that the claim was non-dischargeable.
Submitted by Anonymous (not verified) on Fri, 02/21/2014 - 00:15
In the recent case of Guillermo A. Morales, Case No. 07-16284-BKC-RBR, (Bankr.S.D.Fla. January 2, 2008)(Ray, J.) the Bankruptcy Court was given the opportunity to interpret new section 222.25(4), Florida Statutes which allows a debtor to exempt personal property not to exceed $4,000 if he does not "claim or receive the benefits of a homestead exemption under s. 4, Art.
Submitted by Anonymous (not verified) on Thu, 02/20/2014 - 23:17
On May 31, 2013, the Florida Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued it decision in the case of Zlatkis v. All America Team Concepts, LLC upheld the validity and enforcement of spendthrift trusts. In this case, a judgement holder attempted to enforce its judgment against the debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust.
Submitted by Anonymous (not verified) on Thu, 02/20/2014 - 22:53
On June 27, 2012, the Florida Second District Court of Appeals issued its decision in Geraci v. Ems, 93 So. 3d 384 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2012). The issue before the Court was whether a person's long-term leasehold interest in his condominium could qualify as a "homestead" exempt from forced sale under article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution. The lower Court held that it could not qualify as a homestead as it was not a fee simple interest. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that such a condominium may qualify as a homestead.
Submitted by Anonymous (not verified) on Wed, 02/19/2014 - 15:01
Much of my practice today consists of consulting with clients who are interested in saving their real estate from foreclosure using Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The discussions breakdown into two different categories - real estate that is used as a principal residence and real estate that is not used as a principal residence.
Submitted by Anonymous (not verified) on Fri, 02/14/2014 - 20:04
Bankruptcy Judge K. Rodney May from the Middle District of Florida held that the equity passively resulting from market appreciation is not to be counted towards the $125,000.00 cap placed by 11 USC 522 (p) on a homestead exemption for property "acquired" during the 1,215 prepetition period. In re Chouinard, 2006 WL 3873437 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.). The Court followed the holding of In re Rasmussen, 349 B.R. 747 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) that passive market appreciation is not an interest that a debtor "acquired" during the 1,215 period. See also In re Sainlar, 344 B.R. 669 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
Submitted by Anonymous (not verified) on Thu, 02/13/2014 - 19:45
The January 30, 2007 case of In re Schwarz, __ B.R. ___, 2007 WL247649 (Bkrtcy.S.D. Fla.)(Olson, J.) held certain real property as exempt from administration in the estate under 11 522 (b)(3)(B) which allows for the exemption of any interest in property which the debtor held as tenants by the entireties to the extent that it is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Submitted by Anonymous (not verified) on Thu, 02/13/2014 - 01:40
On July 6, 2007, the court in In re Electric Machinery Enterprises, Inc., ___ B.R. ___, 2007 WL 3031445 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.)(Williamson, J.) issued its decision holding that unsecured creditors are not entitled to collect post-petition attorneys' fees, costs, and other similar charges even if there is an underlying contractual right to them.