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As many readers of our e-mails and blog are aware, if an individual resides in an apartment with a rent controlled or rent stabilized lease and files for personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee assigned to the case can assume, assign and transfer the bankruptcy estate's rights and interests in the lease to the landlord, pursuant to § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. In other words, if an individual resides in an apartment with a rent controlled or rent stabilized lease and the fair market rent of the apartment is significantly greater than the rent paid by the rent controlled or rent stabilized tenant/debtor, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee can sell the bankruptcy estate's rights and interests in the lease to the landlord and remove the debtor/tenant from the apartment.
A more complicated scenario occurs where a married couple are both signatories on a rent controlled or rent stabilized lease, but only one spouse files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Can the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee sell the bankruptcy estate's rights and interests in the rent controlled or rent stabilized to the landlord free and clear of the non-filing spouse to the landlord and remove the non-filing spouse from the apartment?
While there are no reported decisions on point in the Southern or Eastern Districts of New York, § 363(h) of the Bankruptcy Codeallows a bankruptcy trustee to sell a bankruptcy estate's interest in property and the interest of a non-debtor co-owner in the property as a joint tenant, a tenant in common or a tenant by the entirety, but only if:
1. Partition in kind of the property among the bankruptcy estate and the co-owners is impracticable;
2. The sale of the bankruptcy estate's undivided interest in the property would realize significantly less for the bankruptcy estate than the sale of the property free of the interests of the co-owners;
3. The benefit to the bankruptcy estate of a sale of the property free of the interests of co-owners outweighs the detriment, if any, to the co-owners; and
4. The property is not used in the production, transmission, or distribution, for sale, of electric energy or of natural or synthetic gas for heat, light, or power.
If a Chapter 7 Trustee decided to analyze the assumption, assignment and sale of a rent controlled or rent stabilized lease to which a non-debtor spouse is a party using the §363(h) factors, the lease could be at risk. A better strategy for a couple in this situation, if they want to keep the apartment, is to do an out of court workout with creditorsor file for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Individuals or couples who are in debt and have a rent controlled or rent stabilized lease need to consult with an experienced personal bankruptcy attorney, such as Jim Shenwick.
Fitch Ratings, a major agency that gauges the health of financial instruments, sees a river of red in the private student loan market.
With anywhere from 22% of 55% of trusts issued by National Collegiate Student Loan Trust, Fitch Ratings on October 1, 2013 downgraded 42 classes of the portfolio.
That may not mean much to you, but consider the broader context.
More Private Student Loans In Default
According to Fitch, defaults on private loans held by National Collegiate Student Loan Trust range approximately from 22% to 55% depending on the trust.
Fitch’s outlook for the future performance is also considered negative because the trusts continue to experience high default levels in excess of Fitch’s initial expectations.
Overall, there’s about $8.1 billion in private student loans in default.
See also:
- Fitch Takes Rating Actions on National Collegiate Student Loans
- Here’s How Private Student Loan Debt Became A $150 Billion Burden
More Federal Student Loans In Default
The federal student loan default rate is at the highest rate in nearly 20 years, with 1 in 10 recent borrowers defaulting on federal student loans within the first two years. This, according to annual figures released on September 30, 2013 by the U.S. Department of Education.
The statistics don’t get much better with older loans, either. For loans that are 3 years into repayment, one in seven borrowers with federal student loans are in default.
All This As Student Loan Debt Grows To Epic Proportions
There’s $1.2 triilion in outstanding federal student loan debt.
That doesn’t count the private student loans.
12 million students – or 60% – borrow annually to help cover costs.
There are approximately 37 million student loan borrowers with outstanding student loans today.
If that doesn’t make your head spin, not much will.
See also:
- Student Debt Swells, Federal Loans Now Top a Trillion
- Chronicle of Higher Education
- Federal Reserve Board of New York
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust Leading The Next Perfect Storm?
The last time a field of securitized trusts went down we were talking about the foreclosure market. And though that debacle left us with a hangover that persists 5 years later, there was one major difference – the mortgage lenders had houses they could take back to minimize their losses.
What can a private student loan lender do if you fail to pay? They can sue you and, in some places, levy your bank account or slap a garnishment on your wages. Doing so will provide a payment stream, but only a small one at best over a course of years.
If you decide to fight the lawsuit, you have a chance of either winning or getting a settlement out of the lender because in some ways they’re at your mercy.
Though I’m no fortuneteller, I’m willing to bet Fitch’s actions in downgrading the creditworthiness of National Collegiate Student Loan Trust is just the beginning.
Stay tuned.
image: www.solvencyiiwire.com
Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has over 25 years of experience in filing Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. His office is centrally located in Miami at 1221 Brickell Avenue, 9th Fl., Miami and may be reached at (305) 891-4055. www.bublicklaw.com
The Court in the case of James P. Driscoll, Inc., et al. v. Theodore B. Gould, 32 FLW D2467 (3rd DCA 2007) dealt with a judgment that was not listed in chapter 11 schedules. The Defendant claimed that the post-confirmation debtor did not have standing as the judgment was not listed in the bankruptcy schedules. Parker v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc. 365 F.3d 1268, (11th Cir. 2004). There is an independent avenue under which property may revest in the debtor at conclusion of a Chapter 11 proceeding, which is the express terms and conditions of the confirmed plan of reorganization. See In re Coastline Care, Inc., 299 B.R. 373, (Bankr. EDNC 2003). Here the plan released and revested the right to pursue the judgment to the debtor upon consummation and closure of the bankruptcy case. See In re Coastline Care, Inc. 299 B.R. at 377-78. Jordan E. Bublick is a Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer with over 25 years of experience in filing chapter 13 and chapter 7 bankruptcies. Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has filed over 8,000 chapter 13 and chapter 7 cases.
Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has over 25 years of experience in filing Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. His office is centrally located in Miami at 1221 Brickell Avenue, 9th Fl., Miami and may be reached at (305) 891-4055. www.bublicklaw.com
The Court in the case of James P. Driscoll, Inc., et al. v. Theodore B. Gould, 32 FLW D2467 (3rd DCA 2007) dealt with a judgment that was not listed in chapter 11 schedules. The Defendant claimed that the post-confirmation debtor did not have standing as the judgment was not listed in the bankruptcy schedules. Parker v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc. 365 F.3d 1268, (11th Cir. 2004). There is an independent avenue under which property may revest in the debtor at conclusion of a Chapter 11 proceeding, which is the express terms and conditions of the confirmed plan of reorganization. See In re Coastline Care, Inc., 299 B.R. 373, (Bankr. EDNC 2003). Here the plan released and revested the right to pursue the judgment to the debtor upon consummation and closure of the bankruptcy case. See In re Coastline Care, Inc. 299 B.R. at 377-78. Jordan E. Bublick is a Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer with over 25 years of experience in filing chapter 13 and chapter 7 bankruptcies. Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has filed over 8,000 chapter 13 and chapter 7 cases.
Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has over 25 years of experience in filing Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. His office is centrally located in Miami at 1221 Brickell Avenue, 9th Fl., Miami and may be reached at (305) 891-4055. www.bublicklaw.com
In the case of In re Parada, 2008 WL 126626 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla. January 10, 2008)(Isicoff, J.) the court was presented with the U.S. Trustee's motion to dismiss the chapter 7 debtors' case as an abuse pursuant to section 707(b)(1) by the application of the section 707(b)(2) means test presumption and pursuant to the 707(b)(3)(B) totality of the circumstances of the financial situation test. The court found that while the debtors passed the means test, they did not pass the totality of the circumstances of the debtors' financial situation test. The major factor in this determination was the court's ruling that the deduction of the secured debt on the debtors' residence and vehicle that they intended to and did indeed surrender were deductible for purposes of the 707(b)(2) means test, but were not deductible for the 707(b)(3)(B) totality of the circumstances of the debtors' financial situation test.
The debtors' Form B22A did not indicate that the presumption of abuse under section 707(b)(2) arose. However, the U.S. Trustee filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the section 707(b)(2) presumption of abuse did indeed arise based on their assertion that the debtors' deduction of their payments on the former residence and vehicle which they intended to surrender was improper. The court noted that the debtors' statement of intentions indicated an intention to surrender their former residence which was encumbered by a mortgage of almost $500,000.00 and to surrender their BMW for which they owed almost $20,000.00. The court noted that the debtors were no longer living at their former residence and had surrendered the vehicle post-petition. Furthermore, the debtors reported monthly gross income of almost $9,000.00 and deductions for voluntary 401(k) contributions of about $400.00.
The court noted that there are two opposite interpretation of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) as to the allowability of secured debt payments on account of assets surrendered post-petition. One line of cases adopts a "snapshot" (or "mechanical") approach as of the petition date and allows the payments to be deducted whether or not the debtor intends to make the payments. See In re Benedetti, 372 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 2007). The other line of cases holds that only those payments the debtor reasonably expects to be made during the next sixty months may be deducted. The court adopted the "snapshot" approach and allowed the deduction for purposes of the means test calculation of amounts that would be due but which the debtor may not pay to secured creditors on account of property they intend to and in fact do surrender post-petition. The court therefore found that the section 707(b)(2) presumption of abuse did not arise.
The U.S. Trustee also sought a finding of abuse based on the totality of the circumstances of the debtors' financial situation. 11 U.S.C. section 707(b)(3)(B). The debtors argued that the totality of the circumstances, including their financial situation, did not merit dismissal. The court noted that section 707(b)(3) provides for two separate grounds for the dismissal of a debtor's case - (A) bad faith and (B) the totality of the circumstances of the debtor's financial situation. The court held that "the lack of indicia of bad faith and other factors unrelated to a debtor's financial situation are not relevant to consideration under the totality of the circumstances test of 11 U.S.C. section 707(b)(3)(B), rather, they are relevant to determining abuse under the bad faith standard of 11 U.S.C. section 707(b)(3)(A)."
The court agreed with the decision in In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2007)(Hyman, C.J.), and held that the court should consider post-petition events in making its determination under section 707(b)(3)(B). The court further held that the cut-off date for the relevancy of post-petition circumstances is the date of the hearing on the motion to dismiss.
In determining whether the debtors' financial situation demonstrated abuse, the court applied a test of whether they had sufficient projected disposable income to fund a hypothetical chapter 13 case. In re Henebury, 361 B.R. at 611. The court noted that there were two methods used by the courts to determine a debtor's projected disposable income under the totality of the circumstances analysis - one based on the debtor's CMI and the other based on the debtor's net income based on actual anticipated income and expenses over the chapter 13 plan period which in this case would be sixty months as the debtors' CMI was above-median income. The court agreed with the U.S. Trustee and held that in calculating the debtors' ability to pay their unsecured debt under section 707(b)(3), that they may not take into account the payments with respect to the surrendered house and car. The court held that "[a]lthough these payments were properly deducted for purposes of the means test, when determining the Debtors' projected disposable income, it is appropriate to exclude these deductions as the payments clearly will not be made going forward, and therefore will not negatively impact the Debtors' disposable income." The court also agreed with the U.S. Trustee that, absent special circumstances, voluntary contributions to a 401(k) should not be considered reasonably necessary expenses under the totality of the circumstances analysis. The court did not find special circumstances in this case.
The court found that, with the exclusion of the nonallowed deductions, both methods of determining the debtors' projected disposable income (the CMI method or the net income method) indicated that the debtors' had the sufficient income to repay 100% of their unsecured debt in less than five year. The court refused to take into consideration in determining the totality of the circumstances financial situation factors that were not verifiable and too remote at the time of the hearing on the motion, such as the debtors' submission that their reconciliation had failed and that they intended to move into separate apartments.
The court found that based on the totality of the circumstances of the debtors' financial situation, that the debtors were abusing the bankruptcy code. 11 U.S.C. section 707(b)(3)(B). But the court did not find that the case was filed in bad faith under section 707(b)(3)(A) and therefore allowed the debtors ten days to convert their case to a case under chapter 13 or 11 before the court would dismiss their case. See, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 127 S.Ct. 1105 (2007).Jordan E. Bublick is a Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer with over 25 years of experience in filing chapter 13 and chapter 7 bankruptcies. Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has filed over 8,000 chapter 13 and chapter 7 cases.
Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has over 25 years of experience in filing Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. His office is centrally located in Miami at 1221 Brickell Avenue, 9th Fl., Miami and may be reached at (305) 891-4055. www.bublicklaw.com
In the case of In re Parada, 2008 WL 126626 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla. January 10, 2008)(Isicoff, J.) the court was presented with the U.S. Trustee's motion to dismiss the chapter 7 debtors' case as an abuse pursuant to section 707(b)(1) by the application of the section 707(b)(2) means test presumption and pursuant to the 707(b)(3)(B) totality of the circumstances of the financial situation test. The court found that while the debtors passed the means test, they did not pass the totality of the circumstances of the debtors' financial situation test. The major factor in this determination was the court's ruling that the deduction of the secured debt on the debtors' residence and vehicle that they intended to and did indeed surrender were deductible for purposes of the 707(b)(2) means test, but were not deductible for the 707(b)(3)(B) totality of the circumstances of the debtors' financial situation test.
The debtors' Form B22A did not indicate that the presumption of abuse under section 707(b)(2) arose. However, the U.S. Trustee filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the section 707(b)(2) presumption of abuse did indeed arise based on their assertion that the debtors' deduction of their payments on the former residence and vehicle which they intended to surrender was improper. The court noted that the debtors' statement of intentions indicated an intention to surrender their former residence which was encumbered by a mortgage of almost $500,000.00 and to surrender their BMW for which they owed almost $20,000.00. The court noted that the debtors were no longer living at their former residence and had surrendered the vehicle post-petition. Furthermore, the debtors reported monthly gross income of almost $9,000.00 and deductions for voluntary 401(k) contributions of about $400.00.
The court noted that there are two opposite interpretation of section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) as to the allowability of secured debt payments on account of assets surrendered post-petition. One line of cases adopts a "snapshot" (or "mechanical") approach as of the petition date and allows the payments to be deducted whether or not the debtor intends to make the payments. See In re Benedetti, 372 B.R. 90 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 2007). The other line of cases holds that only those payments the debtor reasonably expects to be made during the next sixty months may be deducted. The court adopted the "snapshot" approach and allowed the deduction for purposes of the means test calculation of amounts that would be due but which the debtor may not pay to secured creditors on account of property they intend to and in fact do surrender post-petition. The court therefore found that the section 707(b)(2) presumption of abuse did not arise.
The U.S. Trustee also sought a finding of abuse based on the totality of the circumstances of the debtors' financial situation. 11 U.S.C. section 707(b)(3)(B). The debtors argued that the totality of the circumstances, including their financial situation, did not merit dismissal. The court noted that section 707(b)(3) provides for two separate grounds for the dismissal of a debtor's case - (A) bad faith and (B) the totality of the circumstances of the debtor's financial situation. The court held that "the lack of indicia of bad faith and other factors unrelated to a debtor's financial situation are not relevant to consideration under the totality of the circumstances test of 11 U.S.C. section 707(b)(3)(B), rather, they are relevant to determining abuse under the bad faith standard of 11 U.S.C. section 707(b)(3)(A)."
The court agreed with the decision in In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2007)(Hyman, C.J.), and held that the court should consider post-petition events in making its determination under section 707(b)(3)(B). The court further held that the cut-off date for the relevancy of post-petition circumstances is the date of the hearing on the motion to dismiss.
In determining whether the debtors' financial situation demonstrated abuse, the court applied a test of whether they had sufficient projected disposable income to fund a hypothetical chapter 13 case. In re Henebury, 361 B.R. at 611. The court noted that there were two methods used by the courts to determine a debtor's projected disposable income under the totality of the circumstances analysis - one based on the debtor's CMI and the other based on the debtor's net income based on actual anticipated income and expenses over the chapter 13 plan period which in this case would be sixty months as the debtors' CMI was above-median income. The court agreed with the U.S. Trustee and held that in calculating the debtors' ability to pay their unsecured debt under section 707(b)(3), that they may not take into account the payments with respect to the surrendered house and car. The court held that "[a]lthough these payments were properly deducted for purposes of the means test, when determining the Debtors' projected disposable income, it is appropriate to exclude these deductions as the payments clearly will not be made going forward, and therefore will not negatively impact the Debtors' disposable income." The court also agreed with the U.S. Trustee that, absent special circumstances, voluntary contributions to a 401(k) should not be considered reasonably necessary expenses under the totality of the circumstances analysis. The court did not find special circumstances in this case.
The court found that, with the exclusion of the nonallowed deductions, both methods of determining the debtors' projected disposable income (the CMI method or the net income method) indicated that the debtors' had the sufficient income to repay 100% of their unsecured debt in less than five year. The court refused to take into consideration in determining the totality of the circumstances financial situation factors that were not verifiable and too remote at the time of the hearing on the motion, such as the debtors' submission that their reconciliation had failed and that they intended to move into separate apartments.
The court found that based on the totality of the circumstances of the debtors' financial situation, that the debtors were abusing the bankruptcy code. 11 U.S.C. section 707(b)(3)(B). But the court did not find that the case was filed in bad faith under section 707(b)(3)(A) and therefore allowed the debtors ten days to convert their case to a case under chapter 13 or 11 before the court would dismiss their case. See, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 127 S.Ct. 1105 (2007).Jordan E. Bublick is a Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer with over 25 years of experience in filing chapter 13 and chapter 7 bankruptcies. Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has filed over 8,000 chapter 13 and chapter 7 cases.
In the case of In re Hionas, ___ B.R. ___, 2006 WL 3913760 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.)(Isicoff J.) the Bankruptcy Court denied a casino's motion for summary judgment in its adversary proceeding to determine an alleged gambling debt nondischargeable. The decision also provides a review of the rules of choice of law in the 11th Circuit in the context of the allowance of a claim in a bankruptcy case.
The Court noted that normally a federal court hearing a matter pursuant to diversity jurisdiction must apply the law of the state in which the court sits pursuant to the ruling in the case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), including the conflict of law rules of the state in which the federal court sits. However, a federal court with jurisdiction over a matter by virtue of its bankruptcy jurisdiction, when considering the allowance of claims, is not sitting as a court of diversity and the court does not apply the law of the state where it sits. Bankruptcy courts must determine how and what claims should be allowed under equitable principles.
The Court stated that there is apparently a split among the courts as to whether a bankruptcy court should apply the conflicts of law provisions of the state in which it sits or whether it should apply federal law to determine which law should apply. But the Court stated that there does not appear to be a conflict when a bankruptcy court is considering allowance of claims, which is a matter subject to the bankruptcy court's core jurisdiction. The Court reviewed the Supreme Court's decision of Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946) and stated that it held that the determination by a bankruptcy court of which state law should apply in adjudicating the allowability of a claim should not be dictated by the happenstance of where the bankruptcy case is filed, but rather which law more logically relates to the claim and is most consistent with the dictates of the court's equitable jurisdiction. Furthermore this determination requires the exercise of an informed judgment in the balancing of all the interests of the states with the most significant contacts in order best to accomodate the equities among the parties to the policies of those states.
The Court further found that each of the cases that have followed Vanston in the context of the allowance of a claim have been consistent in recognizing the inapplicability of Erie and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) and apply a federal analysis to the choice of law issue in the claims allownace context. The Court noted that in the 11th Circuit, in order to determine which law should apply in making a decision regarding choice of law, the court must apply the "significant relationship" test although, depending on the nature of the dispute, more specific factors may have a bearing on the court's determination. See Dresdner Bank A.G v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 446 F.3d 1377 (11th Cir.2006).
The Court concluded by pointing out that whether Nevada law applies to the involved decision would be based on the significant relationships test and not solely on the language in the involved contracts.Jordan E. Bublick is a Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer with over 25 years of experience in filing chapter 13 and chapter 7 bankruptcies. Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has filed over 8,000 chapter 13 and chapter 7 cases.
Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has over 25 years of experience in filing chapter 13 and chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. His office is centrally located in Miami at 1221 Brickell Avenue, 9th Fl., Miami and may be reached at (305) 891-4055. www.bublicklaw.com
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
A chapter 13 bankruptcy is also called a wage earner's plan. It enables individuals with a regular income to develop a plan to repay all or part of their debts.
Length of Chapter 13 Plan. Under chapter13, debtors propose a repayment plan to make installments to creditors over three to five years. If the debtor's current monthly income is less than the applicable state median, the plan will be for three years unless the court approves a longer period "for cause." If the debtor's current monthly income is greater than the applicable state median, the plan generally must be for five years. In no case may a plan provide for payments over a period longer than five years. 11 U.S.C. §1322(d). During this time the law forbids creditors from starting or continuing collection efforts
Advantages of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7. Chapter 13 offers individuals a number of advantages over a chapter 7 case. Perhaps most significantly, chapter 13 offers individuals an opportunity to save their homes from foreclosure. By filing under this chapter, individuals can stop foreclosure proceedings and may cure delinquent mortgage payments over time. Nevertheless, they must still make all mortgage payments that come due during the chapter 13 plan on time.
Another advantage of chapter 13 is that it allows individuals to reschedule secured debts (other than a mortgage for their primary residence) and extend them over the life of the chapter 13 plan. Doing this may lower the payments.
Chapter 13 also has a special provision that protects third parties who are liable with the debtor on "consumer debts." This provision may protect co-signers.
Finally, chapter 13 acts like a consolidation loan under which the individual makes the plan payments to a chapter 13 trustee who then distributes payments to creditors. Individuals will have no direct contact with creditors while under chapter 13 protectionJordan E. Bublick is a Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer with over 25 years of experience in filing chapter 13 and chapter 7 bankruptcies. Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has filed over 8,000 chapter 13 and chapter 7 cases.
In most cases, bankruptcy has no effect on current or future employment. Many consumers new to the bankruptcy filing process may worry about suffering potential consequences if they decide to file. This is a common question asked about at the beginning of the filing process. For the most part, the bankruptcy code includes a special [...]
Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has over 25 years of experience in filing Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. His office is centrally located in Miami at 1221 Brickell Avenue, 9th Fl., Miami and may be reached at (305) 891-4055. www.bublicklaw.com
The following are some of the options open to the South Florida distressed homeowner:
1. Mortgage Modification - HAMP or otherwise. As the mortgage companies have ramped up their staffing, the ability to achieve a HAMP or other modification has been increasing. The government regulations have also been improved over time to increase the achievement of modifications.
2. Short Sale - often favored by real estate brokers, but may soon have more actual benefit for homeowners if FNMA guidelines are changed to allow for better future credit for short sales rather than foreclosure.
3. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure - the homeowner gives a deed to the mortgage company to avoid a full judicial foreclosure. Often not requested by mortgage companies due to possible title issues.
4. "Walk Away" from Home
5. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy - often combining the filing of chapter 13 bankruptcy and the use of the Bankruptcy Court's new mediation program for Mortgage Modification program.
Jordan E. Bublick is a Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer with over 25 years of experience in filing chapter 13 and chapter 7 bankruptcies. Miami Personal Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick has filed over 8,000 chapter 13 and chapter 7 cases.
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