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9 years 11 months ago

Everyone typically wants to know how long a bankruptcy case is going to take from start to finish. There is so much uncertainty about the process and about what a client must do to make it work. The transcript from the Video below outlines some of the keys points regarding timing. Please keep in mind+ Read MoreThe post What Happens Immediately After A Bankruptcy Case Is Filed? appeared first on David M. Siegel.


9 years 11 months ago


Right now, filing bankruptcy does little to alleviate the burden of Student Loan debt, aside for temporarily deferring monthly payment requirements.  Student loan debt is preventing young people from buying homes because they cannot afford to make student loan payments and  mortgage payments.

Here is some potential relief to those who now owe student loans with a high rate of interest:

U.S. Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) joined U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) today introducing the Bank on Students Emergency Loan Refinancing Act, which would allow those with outstanding student loan debt to refinance at the lower interest rates currently offered to new borrowers. Durbin, Warren, and Reed have been working together on efforts to build broad support in the Senate for legislative action to reduce new student loan debt and make it easier for millions of working families to manage the student loan debt they already have.

Many borrowers with outstanding student loans have interest rates of nearly 7 percent or higher for under U.S. Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) joined U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) today introducing the Bank on Students Emergency Loan Refinancing Act, which would allow those with outstanding student loan debt to refinance at the lower interest rates currently offered to new borrowers. Durbin, Warren, and Reed have been working together on efforts to build broad support in the Senate for legislative action to reduce new student loan debt and make it easier for millions of working families to manage the student loan debt they already have.

For the rest of the article, please click:

U.S. Senate Press Release

If you are interested in lowering student loan interest rate, please contact your Senator as this looks like a good bill that should become law.

Attorney Ken Jorgensen is located in Clovis, California.  He handles personal, property and business disputes, including bankruptcy and eviction cases in California.  You can find out more about Ken on Facebook, or at his websites, www.fresnolawgroup.com and www.fresnobankruptcylawgroup.com.  He can be reached at [email protected] or by telephone at 1-559-324-1882.
Photo Credit: donkeyhotey at Flickr


9 years 10 months ago

(305) 891-4055 - 25 Years of Experience,  Over 8,000 Cases Filed - Free Initial Consultation - Miami Bankruptcy Lawyer Jordan E. Bublick - 1221 Brickell Ave., Miami, Florida - Chapter 13 and 7 Bankruptcy - www.bublicklaw.com

In December, 2007, Congress passed the "Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007" to alleviate tax consequence for some homeowners in foreclosure. This act was scheduled to expire on December 31, 2012, but was subsequently extended for another year. This Act excludes from taxable gross income certain cancelled discharged debt that may otherwise arise with respect to a "qualified principal residence indebtedness."

Existing tax law provides that discharged debt, whether after a foreclosure or short sale, is generally taxable income realized in the year the debt was forgiven, unless an exception applies. Generally only reductions in principal and not forgiveness of interest results in discharge of indebtedness income ("DOI"). Usually a lender is required to issue a Form 1099-C to report the DOI to the IRS. Taxpayers are required to disclose DOI to the IRS whether the lender issues a 1099-C or not. Taxpayers may be able to exclude the DOI from income if an exceptions to DOI applies.

Exceptions

Two existing exceptions to DOI are the insolvency and bankruptcy exceptions. 26 U.S.C. section 108(d). If the borrower is insolvent, DOI is not taxable. If the debt is discharged in bankruptcy, DOI is also not taxable. Another exception is the "purchase price infirmity doctrine". This allows DOI to be excluded from income where the lender agrees to write down the purchase money debt to the true value of the collateral as the purchase price was inflated in the original transaction due to fraud or misrepresentation. Another exception from DOI is when the liability was contested. Pursuant to Zarin v. Comm'r, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.1990), DOI is not income where there is a legitimate basis for the borrower to claim that the debt was never owed or collectible because illegal.

The new Act adds to the existing exceptions from DOI a category of "qualified principal residence indebtedness." Up to $2 million of indebtedness may be excluded if the reason for the discharge is either a decline in the residence's value or the taxpayer's financial condition. It should be noted that debt excluded by the Act reduces the taxpayer's basis and a "short sale" could result in a taxable "gain" which may be taxable as a capital gains.

In order for this new exception to apply, the debt must be "qualified" which includes only acquisition and not home equity indebtedness. Acquisition indebtedness includes funds borrowed to buy, construct, or improve a home. Debt consolidation loans or cash out loans are generally not acquisition indebtedness. The Act only applies to debt discharged between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2009. Pub.L.No. 110-142 Section 2(d). If acquisition debt is refinance, the refinanced principal amount retains its status as acquisition indebtedness. The excess of the total refinanced loan amount over the refinanced acquisition indebtedness is treated as home equity indebtedness and is not eligible for exclusion from income. Acquisition indebtedness included loans to "substantially improve" the principal residence.

This new exclusion only applies if the debt was discharged due to the borrower's financial condition or a decline in the home's value. A discharged based on the lender's acknowledgment of its wrongdoing or even rescission is not eligible for the qualified principal residence exclusion. Documentationj in any litigation or settlement that one of the required grounds is the basis for the discharge of the debt would be helpful.

The homeowner must apparently elect to take either the qualified principal residental exception or the insolvency exception. The insolvency exception, if elected, is "in lieu of" the qualified principal residence excetion.Jordan E. Bublick is a Miami Bankruptcy Lawyer with over 25 years of experience in filing Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases and Mortgage Modifications (305) 891-4055


9 years 11 months ago

If you are struggling financially, please know that help is available. You do not have to go through another spring and another summer with financial problems. Have you looked into filing bankruptcy? Have you looked into reorganizing under chapter 13? Have you explored all of your options to get out of this debt? If not,+ Read MoreThe post When Debt Has Got You Down…..Consider This! appeared first on David M. Siegel.


9 years 11 months ago

In the recent case of Guillermo A. Morales, Case No. 07-16284-BKC-RBR, (Bankr.S.D.Fla. January 2, 2008)(Ray, J.) the Bankruptcy Court was given the opportunity to interpret new section 222.25(4), Florida Statutes which allows a debtor to exempt personal property not to exceed $4,000 if he does not "claim or receive the benefits of a homestead exemption under s. 4, Art. X of the State Constitution." Based on the particular facts of the case, the Court held that the debtor had not proven that he had not received the "benefits" of the homestead exemption and the trustee's objection to the debtor's exemption under section 222.25(4), Florida Statutes was sustained. But the court did state that if a debtor properly abandons his entire interest in his homestead at the start of a case or and does not claim his homestead exemption or does so by proper subsequent schedule amendments, then he would be able to claim the $4,000 section 222.25(4) personal property exemption.

F
In his chapter 7 schedules, the debtor listed one piece of real property with two mortgages. He did not claim the real property as exempt in his schedule C. In his original statement of intentions, the debtor set forth his intentions to reaffirm the two mortgages. Later he filed an amended statement of intentions where he indicated that his intentions were to surrender the real property to one of the mortgagees and reaffirm [sic] the other mortgage. The debtor claimed the use the $4000 personal property exemption under section 222.25(4), Florida Statutes (2007) and the trustee filed an objection to this claim of exemption.

The issue before the court was the meaning of section 222.25(4)'s phrase "receive the benefits of a homestead exemption." The trustee argued that the debtor was not eligible for the section 222.25(4) exemption as by owning a homestead, the debtor receives the benefit of the homestead exemption whether or not he makes use of it. The debtor contended that he had abandoned his interest in the real property, had not claimed it as exempt in his schedule C, and was not receiving any "benefits" of a homestead exemption.

The court looked to the language of the statute and found that it was written in the present tense. The court stated that the fact that a "debtor may have claimed or received the benefits of a homestead exemption in the past would appear to have no bearing on the application of the statute to a debtor's present situation." The court reasoned that even if a debtor had in the past received the benefits of the homestead exemption, he would qualify for the $4,000 section 222.25(4) personal property exemption if he does not claim it [the real property] as exempt and ceases to receive the benefits of a homestead exemption.

The court noted that in this case, that although debtor did not claim the homestead exemption, it was not clear whether he had derived any "benefits" from the exemption. The debtor argued that his amended statement of intentions to surrender the real property constituted an "abandonment" of the real property and that he was no longer receiving any "benefit" of the homestead exemption.

The court stated that the debtor was correct in his statement that under Florida law, abandonment of a homestead is one way that the protection of the homestead exemption may be lost. However, the court concluded that the debtor had failed to clearly indicate his intention with respect to the real property and that the court could not conclude that he had abandoned his homestead. The court noted that at the beginning of the case, the debtor had filed a statement of intentions indicating his intention to reaffirm the mortgages and retain the real property. The debtor only later changed his mind. The court also found "incompatible" with an abandonment the debtor's stated intention in his amended statement of intentions to surrender the real property to only one of the two mortgage holders and reaffirm the debt owed to the other mortgage holder.

Although the court failed to find an abandonment of the homestead in this case which led to the court's denial of the debtor's claim of exemption under section 222.25(4), the court stated that if a debtor "properly abandons his entire interest in his homestead at the start of a case and does not claim his homestead exemption" then he would be able to claim the $4,000 section 222.25(4) personal property exemption. The court even left open the possibility of a subsequent amendment of the debtor's schedules to indicate an abandonment of all interest in his homestead and to claim the $4,000 section 222.25(4) personal property exemptions.

In this case, the court found that the debtor failed to clearly indicate his intentions with respect to the real property and was denied use of the section 222.25(4) exemptions. Since the rendering of the court's decision, the debtor filed an amended statement of intentions setting forth a surrender to both mortgagees and has moved the court for a rehearing. In his motion for rehearing, the debtor refers to this amended statement of intention and points out that he did not oppose the motion for stay relief filed by one of the mortgagees.(305) 891-4055 - Jordan E. Bublick is a Miami Bankruptcy Lawyer with over 25 years of experience in filing Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 Bankrkuptcy Cases and Mortgage Modifications


9 years 10 months ago

In the recent case of Guillermo A. Morales, Case No. 07-16284-BKC-RBR, (Bankr.S.D.Fla. January 2, 2008)(Ray, J.) the Bankruptcy Court was given the opportunity to interpret new section 222.25(4), Florida Statutes which allows a debtor to exempt personal property not to exceed $4,000 if he does not "claim or receive the benefits of a homestead exemption under s. 4, Art. X of the State Constitution." Based on the particular facts of the case, the Court held that the debtor had not proven that he had not received the "benefits" of the homestead exemption and the trustee's objection to the debtor's exemption under section 222.25(4), Florida Statutes was sustained. But the court did state that if a debtor properly abandons his entire interest in his homestead at the start of a case or and does not claim his homestead exemption or does so by proper subsequent schedule amendments, then he would be able to claim the $4,000 section 222.25(4) personal property exemption.

F
In his chapter 7 schedules, the debtor listed one piece of real property with two mortgages. He did not claim the real property as exempt in his schedule C. In his original statement of intentions, the debtor set forth his intentions to reaffirm the two mortgages. Later he filed an amended statement of intentions where he indicated that his intentions were to surrender the real property to one of the mortgagees and reaffirm [sic] the other mortgage. The debtor claimed the use the $4000 personal property exemption under section 222.25(4), Florida Statutes (2007) and the trustee filed an objection to this claim of exemption.

The issue before the court was the meaning of section 222.25(4)'s phrase "receive the benefits of a homestead exemption." The trustee argued that the debtor was not eligible for the section 222.25(4) exemption as by owning a homestead, the debtor receives the benefit of the homestead exemption whether or not he makes use of it. The debtor contended that he had abandoned his interest in the real property, had not claimed it as exempt in his schedule C, and was not receiving any "benefits" of a homestead exemption.

The court looked to the language of the statute and found that it was written in the present tense. The court stated that the fact that a "debtor may have claimed or received the benefits of a homestead exemption in the past would appear to have no bearing on the application of the statute to a debtor's present situation." The court reasoned that even if a debtor had in the past received the benefits of the homestead exemption, he would qualify for the $4,000 section 222.25(4) personal property exemption if he does not claim it [the real property] as exempt and ceases to receive the benefits of a homestead exemption.

The court noted that in this case, that although debtor did not claim the homestead exemption, it was not clear whether he had derived any "benefits" from the exemption. The debtor argued that his amended statement of intentions to surrender the real property constituted an "abandonment" of the real property and that he was no longer receiving any "benefit" of the homestead exemption.

The court stated that the debtor was correct in his statement that under Florida law, abandonment of a homestead is one way that the protection of the homestead exemption may be lost. However, the court concluded that the debtor had failed to clearly indicate his intention with respect to the real property and that the court could not conclude that he had abandoned his homestead. The court noted that at the beginning of the case, the debtor had filed a statement of intentions indicating his intention to reaffirm the mortgages and retain the real property. The debtor only later changed his mind. The court also found "incompatible" with an abandonment the debtor's stated intention in his amended statement of intentions to surrender the real property to only one of the two mortgage holders and reaffirm the debt owed to the other mortgage holder.

Although the court failed to find an abandonment of the homestead in this case which led to the court's denial of the debtor's claim of exemption under section 222.25(4), the court stated that if a debtor "properly abandons his entire interest in his homestead at the start of a case and does not claim his homestead exemption" then he would be able to claim the $4,000 section 222.25(4) personal property exemption. The court even left open the possibility of a subsequent amendment of the debtor's schedules to indicate an abandonment of all interest in his homestead and to claim the $4,000 section 222.25(4) personal property exemptions.

In this case, the court found that the debtor failed to clearly indicate his intentions with respect to the real property and was denied use of the section 222.25(4) exemptions. Since the rendering of the court's decision, the debtor filed an amended statement of intentions setting forth a surrender to both mortgagees and has moved the court for a rehearing. In his motion for rehearing, the debtor refers to this amended statement of intention and points out that he did not oppose the motion for stay relief filed by one of the mortgagees.Jordan E. Bublick is a Miami Bankruptcy Lawyer with over 25 years of experience in filing Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases and Mortgage Modifications (305) 891-4055


9 years 11 months ago

One of the many benefits of filing a chapter 13 bankruptcy case is the ability to repay creditors less than what’s owed in many cases. Some cases don’t require a full payment to unsecured creditors. This all depends upon the income and expenses of the debtor as well as the debtor’s ability to repay the+ Read MoreThe post What Happens To Unsecured Creditors If They Don’t File A Claim? appeared first on David M. Siegel.


9 years 11 months ago

In Chicago and around the country, people are over spending on their credit cards. Maybe it’s the have it now, pay for it later mentality. Maybe it’s the convenience of not having to carry cash. Maybe it’s the enticements of rewards by using the card. Whatever the reason, folks have become too reliant on credit+ Read MoreThe post Credit Card Spending Can Lead To Bankruptcy Filing appeared first on David M. Siegel.


9 years 11 months ago

Private Student Loans + Bankruptcy Reform = Unemployment Chuck told me today that he can’t buy a house because of his private student loans.  Fed Chairman Janet Yellen says he’s not alone–and that student loan debt is holding back jobs and the economic recovery. In her testimony to Congress yesterday, Fed Chairman Janet Yellen said […]The post How Private Student Loans and Bankruptcy Reform Cause Unemployment by Robert Weed appeared first on Robert Weed.


9 years 11 months ago

One spouse of often ordered to pay the attorney fees of the other spouse in a divorce.  In some cases, this obligation to pay the involved attorneys fees is dischargeable in bankruptcy.  This is one of the many issues presented in the application of bankruptcy law to obligations of alimony, child support, and marital settlement agreements. The bankruptcy code's provisions as to the dischargeability of support obligations were significantly changed in the 2005 amendments to the bankruptcy code. It should be noted that there are some differences in the provisions in chapter 7 and chapter 13 bankruptcy.

Atty. Jordan E. Bublick - 1221 Brickell Ave., 9th Fl., Miami, Florida

In some cases, divorce related attorney fees owed are dischargeable in bankruptcy, but in other cases they are not. It generally is based on whether the involved attorney fee fits within the bankruptcy code's definitition of a "domestic support obligation" (DSO).  A decision issued in the Bankruptcy Court in Miami in 2009 in the case of In re Maria D. Lopez, Case No. 08-18101-BKC-LMI (Bankr. S.D.Fla. April 17, 2009)(Isicoff, J.) provides an an example of the application of the rules.  In this case, the Bankruptcy Court held that the involved attorney fees were not entitled to priority status as a "domestic support obligation".

In this case, it was the ex-wife who sought to discharge her obligation to pay her ex-husband's attorney fees that he incurred in their dissolution of marriage case. In the dissolution of marriage case, the family cout awarded the debtor's ex-husband his attorney fees.  When the ex-wife filed for bankruptcy under chapter 13, the ex-husband sought to have these attorneys fees paid in full on a priority status as a "domestic support obligation."  priority status would require full payment and the lack thereof would subject to claim to status as a general unsecured creditor and typically only a small dividend.


Definition of a Domestic Support Obligation

The Court explained that the Bankruptcy Code provides that a DSO owed to a former spouse is entitled to priority status.  The Court noted thought that while an award of attorney fees in some instances may be considered a DSO, not every award of attorney fees in a dissolution of marriage case are entitled to DSO status.

The Court reviewed that  for a claim to be considered as a DSO, it must meet all the requirements of section 101(14A) of the Bankruptcy Code. Generally, the claim must be

  1. owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, or such child's parent or guardian
  2. be in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support
  3. established or subject to establishment by reason of a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement agreement or by court order
  4. not assigned to a nongovernmental entity unless voluntarily assigned for purposes of collection

"In the Nature of Alimony, Maintenance, or Support"
At issue in this case was whether the attorney fees were  "in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support."
The Court rejected the claimant's argument that the attorney fees met the requirement of being "in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support" finding that they instead related to something else - custody, parentage, or visitation.

The Court noted that the determination of what constitutes "support" is a matter of federal law. The Court further noted that in determining whether an award of state court attorneys' fees constitutes "support", the Bankruptcy Court may "only undertake a simple inquiry as to whether the debt can be characterized as 'support'" and that it may look to state law for guidance on whether the obligation should be considered in the nature of "support". Also the Court noted that the state court judgment awarded claimant attorney fees based on the debtor's litigation misconduct and not based on their respective wages or ability to pay.(305) 891-4055 - Jordan E. Bublick is a Miami Bankruptcy Lawyer with over 25 years of experience in filing Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 Bankrkuptcy Cases and Mortgage Modifications


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